Arbitration Law in 2025–2026: Six Significant High Court Decisions on Jurisdiction, Arbitral Proceedings, Interim Relief and Award Challenges

By LegalMantra Editorial Team

Category: Arbitration & Dispute Resolution | Corporate & Commercial Laws
Date: 12th November 2026

Introduction

Arbitration has increasingly become an important mechanism for resolving commercial disputes in India. Businesses prefer arbitration because it offers procedural flexibility, confidentiality, party autonomy and, in appropriate circumstances, a more efficient alternative to conventional civil litigation. However, the effectiveness of arbitration depends considerably on the proper interpretation and application of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Over the years, Indian courts have developed an extensive body of jurisprudence concerning the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals, the validity and scope of arbitration agreements, the determination of the juridical seat, the availability of interim protection and the permissible extent of judicial interference with arbitral awards.

The period 2025–2026 has witnessed several noteworthy High Court decisions addressing these issues. These decisions provide useful guidance on questions such as whether an arbitral tribunal can adjudicate disputes arising before an arbitration agreement was executed, whether parallel civil proceedings can justify termination of arbitration, how the juridical seat should be determined, and when courts can interfere with an arbitral tribunal's interpretation of contractual provisions.

The judgments also examine the enforceability of restrictive covenants through interim measures and clarify the circumstances in which appellate proceedings under the Arbitration Act may continue following the termination of arbitral proceedings.

This article examines six significant decisions reported in SCC's High Court Cases (HCC), explaining their legal principles, judicial reasoning and practical implications for businesses, legal professionals, in-house counsel, arbitrators and corporate compliance practitioners.

1. Jurisdiction of an Arbitral Tribunal: Can Disputes Arising Before an Arbitration Agreement Be Referred to Arbitration?

Case: Maruti Traders v. Itron India (P) Ltd.
Citation: (2026) 1 HCC (Del) 1
Relevant provisions: Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Background of the dispute

The dispute concerned a commercial relationship between the parties that existed over different periods. During the initial period, the business relationship was governed by authorisation letters under which a dealer had been appointed on a non-exclusive basis.

Importantly, these authorisation letters did not contain an arbitration clause.

A subsequent agreement between the parties incorporated an arbitration arrangement. Disputes eventually arose, and certain claims related to transactions and dealings that had taken place before the execution of the subsequent agreement.

The arbitral tribunal declined to entertain claims relating to the earlier period on the ground that no arbitration agreement governed those transactions. The decision was subsequently challenged before the courts under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act.

Legal question

The principal question before the Court was whether an arbitration clause contained in a subsequently executed agreement could extend to disputes arising from an earlier commercial relationship that was not originally governed by an arbitration agreement.

A related question was whether the court could interfere with the arbitral tribunal's decision while examining a challenge under Sections 34 and 37.

Court's observations and legal reasoning

The Court upheld the principle that the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal originates from an arbitration agreement between the parties.

The mere existence of commercial dealings does not automatically create an obligation to resolve disputes through arbitration. Similarly, the execution of a subsequent agreement containing an arbitration clause does not, by itself, confer retrospective jurisdiction upon an arbitral tribunal.

For arbitration to cover disputes arising during an earlier contractual period, there must be a legally sustainable basis establishing that the arbitration agreement extends to those disputes.

In the present case, the earlier authorisation letters did not contain an arbitration clause. Consequently, disputes arising under those arrangements could not automatically be brought within the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal merely because the parties subsequently entered into an agreement containing an arbitration provision.

The Court also reiterated the limited scope of judicial interference under Sections 34 and 37. These provisions do not provide an opportunity for courts to reconsider the entire dispute or substitute their own interpretation for that of the arbitral tribunal.

Interference is justified only where legally recognised grounds, including patent illegality or perversity where applicable, are established.

Since the arbitral tribunal's decision was based on the absence of an arbitration agreement covering the earlier transactions, no sufficient ground for interference was established.

Key legal principle

An arbitration agreement cannot ordinarily be extended retrospectively merely because parties subsequently enter into a commercial contract containing an arbitration clause. The jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal must be established with reference to the actual scope of the arbitration agreement.

Practical implications

This judgment is particularly relevant for businesses that have maintained long-standing commercial relationships through multiple agreements, purchase orders, appointment letters or authorisation arrangements.

Before initiating arbitration, parties should carefully examine:

• Whether an arbitration agreement existed during the relevant contractual period.

• Whether the subsequent agreement expressly covers disputes arising from earlier transactions.

• Whether the arbitration clause contains language extending its application to previous dealings.

• Whether the claims sought to be referred to arbitration fall within the scope of the agreed dispute-resolution mechanism.

For companies, this decision highlights the importance of incorporating appropriately worded dispute-resolution provisions in commercial agreements from the beginning of a business relationship.

It also provides guidance to legal practitioners when assessing the maintainability of arbitration claims arising from multiple contractual arrangements.

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2. Termination of Arbitral Proceedings: Can Pending Civil Litigation Make Arbitration Unnecessary?

Case: Intercode Solutions (P) Ltd. v. Armor India Coding & Imaging Supplies (P) Ltd.
Citation: (2026) 1 HCC (Del) 263
Relevant provision: Section 32(2)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Background of the dispute

The dispute involved arbitral proceedings and parallel civil litigation concerning overlapping issues between the parties.

During the course of arbitration, the question arose whether the existence of civil proceedings addressing similar or connected issues justified bringing the arbitral proceedings to an end.

The arbitral tribunal considered that the continuation of arbitration had become unnecessary or impossible in view of the pending civil proceedings and consequently terminated the arbitral proceedings under Section 32(2)(c) of the Arbitration Act.

The termination order was subsequently challenged.

Understanding Section 32(2)(c)

Section 32 deals with the termination of arbitral proceedings.

Under Section 32(2)(c), the mandate of the arbitral tribunal terminates when the tribunal finds that the continuation of the proceedings has, for any other reason, become unnecessary or impossible.

The provision gives the tribunal the ability to terminate proceedings in circumstances where their continuation is no longer practically or legally justified.

However, this power is not intended to provide an easy exit from arbitration whenever procedural complications arise.

Legal question

Whether the pendency of a civil suit involving overlapping issues between the same parties can independently justify termination of arbitral proceedings under Section 32(2)(c).

In particular, the Court had to consider the meaning and scope of the expressions "unnecessary" and "impossible" appearing in the provision.

Court's observations and legal reasoning

The Court clarified that the existence of parallel civil proceedings does not automatically make arbitration unnecessary or impossible.

An arbitration agreement represents the parties' contractual choice of a dispute-resolution mechanism. Its effectiveness should not be defeated merely because another proceeding involving similar questions is pending before a civil court.

The expressions "unnecessary" and "impossible" must be interpreted in their proper legal and factual context.

The Court emphasised that termination under Section 32(2)(c) should be treated as a measure of last resort rather than a routine procedural solution.

The following circumstances, by themselves, are insufficient to justify termination:

1. The pendency of a civil suit involving similar issues.

2. The possibility that different forums may reach different conclusions.

3. The existence of overlapping factual or legal questions.

4. The perception that one forum may provide a more comprehensive resolution.

5. Procedural inconvenience arising from simultaneous proceedings.

The tribunal must establish that continuation of arbitration has genuinely become unnecessary or impossible for reasons recognised under the provision.

In the present case, the tribunal had relied primarily on the overlapping issues and pendency of civil proceedings without adequately demonstrating an actual legal or practical impediment to continuing the arbitration.

The Court therefore found the approach legally unsustainable and set aside the termination order.

Key legal principle

Parallel civil proceedings do not, merely by their existence, extinguish the contractual right of parties to pursue arbitration. Section 32(2)(c) cannot be invoked simply to avoid procedural inconvenience or the possibility of overlapping adjudication.

Practical implications

This decision is significant for businesses involved in multiple proceedings arising out of the same commercial relationship.

For example, a company may have:

• A contractual dispute referred to arbitration.

• A civil proceeding concerning related commercial transactions.

• Separate proceedings involving connected factual issues.

The mere pendency of one proceeding should not be treated as a reason to abandon another legally maintainable proceeding.

Legal teams should carefully examine whether the proceedings concern identical causes of action, distinct contractual obligations or separate legal remedies.

The judgment also provides an important safeguard against the premature termination of arbitral proceedings and reinforces the principle that contractual dispute-resolution arrangements should ordinarily be respected.

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 3. Determination of the Juridical Seat of Arbitration: Why the Designated Seat Matters

Case: J&K ERA v. Abhiram Infra Projects (P) Ltd.
Citation: (2026) 1 HCC (Del) 310
Relevant provisions: Sections 2(1)(e), 20 and 42 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Background of the dispute

The dispute arose out of an agreement containing provisions governing the conduct of arbitration.

Clause 20.6 of the General Conditions of Contract dealt with the arbitration mechanism. It also contained provisions concerning the place of arbitration and the applicable legal framework.

The contract referred to a neutral location and specified a particular city as the place where arbitration would be conducted. The proceedings were held in Delhi.

A dispute subsequently arose regarding the legal framework applicable to the arbitration.

One of the issues concerned whether the arbitration should be governed by the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, or the Jammu and Kashmir Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997.

The arbitral tribunal concluded that Delhi was the juridical seat of arbitration and that the central Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, governed the proceedings.

This conclusion was challenged before the Court.

Legal question

The principal question was whether Delhi constituted the juridical seat of arbitration and whether the applicable curial law was the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, rather than the separate legislation relied upon by the petitioner.

Court's observations and legal reasoning

The Court examined the contractual provisions and the manner in which the parties had conducted the arbitration.

The determination of the juridical seat is important because it establishes the legal home of arbitration and ordinarily determines which courts exercise supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings.

The Court noted that the contract identified Delhi as the place of arbitration and that the relevant provisions contemplated the arbitration being held there.

There was no sufficient contrary indication in the agreement to establish that another location was intended to function as the juridical seat.

The Court also considered the provision requiring domestic arbitration to be conducted in accordance with the laws of the employer's country.

Since the employer's country was India, and the contractual arrangement did not establish an intention to adopt the Jammu and Kashmir Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997, as a separate governing regime, the reliance on that legislation was not accepted.

Another important consideration was that the parties themselves had proceeded with the arbitration under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

In these circumstances, the Court found no infirmity in the arbitral tribunal's conclusion that Delhi was the juridical seat and that the central legislation governed the proceedings.

Key legal principle

Where the contractual terms designate a particular city as the place of arbitration, and the agreement provides no contrary indication suggesting a different juridical seat, the designated location may constitute the juridical seat of arbitration.

The determination of the seat is not merely a matter of convenience. It has important consequences for supervisory jurisdiction and the applicable procedural framework.

Practical implications

This judgment is particularly relevant for companies entering into infrastructure contracts, government procurement agreements, public-private partnership arrangements and cross-jurisdictional commercial contracts.

While drafting arbitration clauses, parties should clearly distinguish between:

• Seat of arbitration: The juridical location determining the supervisory court's jurisdiction.

• Venue of arbitration: The physical location where hearings or procedural meetings may take place.

• Governing law: The substantive law governing the contractual relationship.

• Curial law: The procedural law governing the arbitration.

Confusion between these concepts may lead to jurisdictional objections, unnecessary litigation and delays in enforcement of arbitral awards.

Companies should therefore ensure that their arbitration clauses expressly identify the juridical seat, governing law and applicable arbitration legislation.

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4. Interpretation of Contractual Provisions by an Arbitral Tribunal: Limits on Judicial Interference

Case: Kanti Builders (P) Ltd. v. Witty Enterprises (P) Ltd.
Citation: (2026) 1 HCC (Bom) 86
Relevant provision: Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Background of the dispute

The dispute involved the interpretation of contractual provisions by an arbitral tribunal.

During the arbitration, the tribunal examined the relevant contractual stipulations and interpreted them in a manner that resulted in an award of counterclaims in favour of the respondent.

The interpretation adopted by the tribunal was subsequently challenged under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.

The central objection concerned whether the tribunal had interpreted the contractual provisions correctly and whether the resulting award warranted judicial interference.

Legal question

To what extent can a court interfere with an arbitral award merely because a party disagrees with the tribunal's interpretation of contractual clauses?

Can an interpretation adopted by an arbitral tribunal be set aside where another interpretation may also be possible?

Court's observations and legal reasoning

The Court reiterated an important principle governing arbitration: interpretation of contractual provisions primarily falls within the domain of the arbitral tribunal.

When parties agree to resolve their contractual disputes through arbitration, they also accept that the tribunal will examine the contractual terms, evaluate the evidence and determine the rights and obligations arising from the agreement.

Consequently, a court exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 is not expected to undertake a fresh interpretation of the contract merely because one of the parties considers the tribunal's interpretation incorrect.

The Court examined whether the interpretation adopted by the arbitral tribunal was one that a reasonable and fair-minded person could arrive at.

It concluded that the tribunal had adopted a plausible interpretation of the contractual provisions.

The fact that another interpretation might also have been possible was not sufficient to invalidate the award.

The Court therefore declined to interfere with the counterclaim awarded in favour of the respondent.

Key legal principle

An arbitral award cannot be set aside merely because the court may prefer a different interpretation of the contract. Where the tribunal's interpretation is a plausible one and does not attract an established ground for setting aside the award, judicial interference is unwarranted.

Practical implications

This decision reinforces the importance of contractual interpretation in commercial arbitration.

For companies, the judgment highlights the need to:

1. Draft contractual clauses with clarity and precision.

2. Avoid contradictory or ambiguous commercial obligations.

3. Maintain documentary evidence supporting contractual performance.

4. Ensure that claims and counterclaims are properly substantiated during arbitration.

5. Understand that Section 34 is not an appellate mechanism for reconsidering every contractual finding.

For in-house legal teams, the judgment is a reminder that the quality of contractual drafting and documentation can significantly influence the outcome of future arbitration proceedings.

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5. Enforcement of Non-Compete and Non-Solicitation Clauses: Interim Protection Under Section 9

Case: Messe Frankfurt Trade Fairs India (P) Ltd. v. Netlink Solutions India Ltd.
Citation: (2026) 1 HCC (Bom) 100
Relevant provisions: Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

Background of the dispute

The dispute arose out of an Asset Purchase Agreement (APA) and its amended version, which contained restrictive covenants relating to non-compete and non-solicitation obligations.

The petitioner alleged that certain respondents had breached these contractual restrictions by being associated with trade exhibitions that allegedly competed with its business.

The petitioner approached the Court under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act and sought interim protection, including restrictions on the conduct of the disputed exhibitions.

The petition raised important questions regarding the enforceability of restrictive covenants, the liability of non-signatories and the circumstances in which interim relief can be granted before or during arbitration.

Legal question

Whether interim protection under Section 9 could be granted to restrain trade exhibitions on the basis of alleged breaches of non-compete and non-solicitation obligations.

The Court also had to examine whether restrictive covenants could be enforced against individuals or entities that were not parties to the relevant agreements.

Court's observations and legal reasoning

The Court declined to grant the requested interim relief after examining the contractual obligations, the evidence presented and the relationship between the respondents and the disputed exhibitions.

A. Requirement of a prima facie case

The Court observed that the petitioner had not sufficiently established that Respondents 1 and 3, who were bound by the restrictive covenants under the APA, were directly or indirectly involved in the exhibitions in question.

A mere previous association or continued proximity between individuals and businesses does not necessarily establish participation in a competing commercial activity.

The party seeking interim protection must produce adequate material demonstrating the alleged breach.

B. Position of non-signatories

The Court also considered the position of Respondent 2, who was not a signatory to the original or amended APA and had not received consideration for the restrictive covenant.

The Court observed that the non-compete obligation could not prima facie be enforced against such a non-signatory employee, particularly after termination of employment.

The restriction was also examined in the context of Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which deals with agreements in restraint of trade.

C. Application of Section 27 of the Contract Act

Section 27 generally renders agreements restraining a person from exercising a lawful profession, trade or business void to the extent of the restraint, subject to the recognised statutory exception.

The Court's observations highlight the difficulties associated with enforcing post-termination non-compete restrictions, particularly against persons who are not parties to the underlying commercial agreement.

D. Relief against third parties

The exhibitions were admittedly organised by Respondent 6, which was not a signatory to the APA.

The Court observed that interim relief against third parties in arbitration-related proceedings must be granted sparingly.

A party cannot ordinarily use Section 9 as a means of directly restraining an independent third party without establishing the necessary connection between the requested relief and the subject matter of the arbitration.

Further, there was insufficient material demonstrating that the exhibitions had actually been organised by Respondents 1 and 3.

E. Delay, suppression and availability of damages

The Court also considered the petitioner's conduct, including suppression of material facts and delay in approaching the Court.

Such circumstances weighed against the grant of equitable interim relief.

The availability of damages as an alternative remedy was another relevant consideration.

Considering the overall circumstances, the Court found no sufficient basis for granting the requested interim measures and dismissed the petition.

Key legal principle

Section 9 provides an important mechanism for protecting parties during arbitration-related disputes, but interim relief is not automatic.

A party seeking to enforce restrictive covenants must establish a prima facie case, demonstrate the relevant contractual obligation and satisfy the requirements for interim protection.

Post-termination non-compete restrictions also face the statutory limitations under Section 27 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

Practical implications

This judgment is particularly relevant for companies involved in acquisitions, business transfers, employee exits, commercial partnerships and event-management arrangements.

Businesses should carefully structure restrictive covenants in their agreements and distinguish between:

• Non-compete obligations.

• Non-solicitation obligations.

• Confidentiality obligations.

• Protection of intellectual property and trade secrets.

• Restrictions applicable during the contractual relationship.

• Restrictions sought to be enforced after termination.

Companies should also ensure that persons against whom restrictive obligations are intended to operate are appropriately bound by the relevant contractual arrangements.

For employers and acquiring businesses, this decision reinforces the importance of obtaining proper contractual commitments instead of assuming that restrictive provisions in one agreement automatically bind employees, affiliates or independent third parties.

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6. Scope of Appellate Proceedings Under Section 37: When Can a Court Resume a Deferred Appeal?

Case: ONGC Ltd. v. Jindal Drilling & Industries Ltd.
Citation: (2025) 3 HCC (Bom) 144
Relevant provisions: Sections 16, 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Background of the dispute

The dispute involved proceedings relating to the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal and the subsequent challenge to orders and awards passed in the matter.

During the proceedings, ONGC sought deferment of the hearing of certain appeals before the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court directed that the hearing of the appeals remain deferred until the reconstituted arbitral tribunal considered the documents sought by the appellant and issued a fresh decision on the jurisdictional issue.

The reconstituted tribunal was subsequently directed to decide the appellant's application for disclosure and inspection of documents, with liberty to the parties to seek permission to introduce additional evidence where appropriate.

The reconstituted tribunal allowed the application for discovery and inspection but ultimately ruled in favour of the respondent on the jurisdictional issue. The respondent was directed to be deleted, and the arbitral proceedings were terminated.

A further dispute then arose regarding whether the appeals should continue to remain deferred.

Legal question

Whether the hearing of appeals could continue to be postponed until the appellant exhausted all available remedies against the reconstituted tribunal's decision under Section 16.

Alternatively, could the appeals be resumed once the specific condition imposed by the Supreme Court for keeping them in abeyance had been fulfilled?

Court's observations and legal reasoning

The Court examined the precise scope of the Supreme Court's earlier directions.

It noted that the deferment of the appeals had been ordered for a specific purpose: to enable the reconstituted arbitral tribunal to consider the application for disclosure and inspection and decide the jurisdictional issue.

The Supreme Court had not directed that the appeals should remain deferred until the appellant exhausted every subsequent remedy available against the reconstituted tribunal's jurisdictional ruling.

The Court therefore distinguished between:

1. The limited period of deferment directed by the Supreme Court.

2. The subsequent remedies available to the appellant under the Arbitration Act.

Once the reconstituted tribunal had considered the documents and decided the jurisdictional issue, the specific condition underlying the deferment had been fulfilled.

The continued postponement of the appeals could not be justified by expanding the scope of the Supreme Court's directions beyond what had actually been ordered.

Accordingly, the Court held that the appeals could no longer remain deferred on the basis of the earlier directions.

The Court also rejected the request to postpone the hearing until the appellant's separate appeal under Section 37 against the jurisdictional ruling had been decided.

Ultimately, the Single Judge's judgment and the arbitral award were upheld, and the appeal was dismissed.

Key legal principle

A judicial direction postponing appellate proceedings must be interpreted according to its actual scope and purpose.

Where a higher court has ordered deferment until the completion of a specific procedural exercise, the deferment cannot automatically be extended until every subsequent remedy available to a party has been exhausted.

Practical implications

This decision is relevant for companies involved in complex, multi-stage arbitration proceedings.

It highlights the importance of carefully examining judicial directions before seeking further adjournments or deferments.

Legal teams should distinguish between:

• Proceedings pending before the arbitral tribunal.

• Jurisdictional objections under Section 16.

• Applications for setting aside awards under Section 34.

• Appeals against specified orders under Section 37.

• Directions issued by superior courts concerning the scheduling or deferment of appeals.

For corporate litigators, the judgment reinforces the principle that procedural directions must be implemented within their actual legal boundaries.

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7. Comparative Overview: Important Legal Principles Emerging from These Decisions

The six decisions collectively address different stages of the arbitration process, from the formation and scope of arbitration agreements to interim protection and challenges to arbitral awards.

The following table summarises their principal contributions.

Case	Principal issue	Important legal principle
Maruti Traders v. Itron India (P) Ltd.	Retrospective jurisdiction	A subsequent arbitration agreement does not automatically cover earlier disputes.
Intercode Solutions (P) Ltd. v. Armor India Coding & Imaging Supplies (P) Ltd.	Termination under Section 32	Parallel civil proceedings alone do not make arbitration unnecessary or impossible.
J&K ERA v. Abhiram Infra Projects (P) Ltd.	Juridical seat	The contractual designation of the seat and surrounding circumstances determine supervisory jurisdiction.
Kanti Builders (P) Ltd. v. Witty Enterprises (P) Ltd.	Section 34 challenge	Courts should not substitute their preferred contractual interpretation for a plausible interpretation adopted by the tribunal.
Messe Frankfurt Trade Fairs India (P) Ltd. v. Netlink Solutions India Ltd.	Restrictive covenants and interim measures	Interim relief requires a prima facie case and must respect the statutory limitations on restraints of trade.
ONGC Ltd. v. Jindal Drilling & Industries Ltd.	Appellate deferment	A deferment order cannot be extended beyond the scope of the directions issued by the superior court.

8. Broader Impact on Arbitration Jurisprudence in India

An examination of these judgments reveals several important developments in the judicial approach towards arbitration.

A. Greater emphasis on party autonomy

Arbitration is founded on the consent of parties. The decisions in Maruti Traders and Intercode Solutions reinforce the importance of respecting the scope and existence of arbitration agreements.

Courts and tribunals must ensure that arbitration is neither extended beyond the parties' contractual consent nor terminated merely because another dispute-resolution proceeding is pending.

B. Maintaining the distinction between arbitral and judicial functions

The decisions in Kanti Builders and Maruti Traders highlight the limited nature of judicial interference under Sections 34 and 37.

Courts are not intended to function as appellate authorities that reconsider every factual finding, contractual interpretation or conclusion reached by an arbitral tribunal.

This approach supports the finality of arbitral awards and prevents arbitration from becoming an additional layer of conventional litigation.

C. Importance of precise arbitration clauses

The decision in J&K ERA highlights the significance of properly drafted arbitration clauses.

Uncertainty concerning the juridical seat, venue, governing law or procedural framework can result in jurisdictional disputes even before the substantive dispute is resolved.

Businesses should therefore ensure that their contracts clearly specify these elements.

D. Balanced protection of commercial interests

The decision in Messe Frankfurt demonstrates that commercial parties may seek interim protection to safeguard their business interests, but such protection is subject to statutory requirements and equitable considerations.

Section 9 cannot be treated as an unrestricted mechanism for enforcing every contractual restriction, particularly against non-signatories or independent third parties.

E. Procedural discipline in arbitration-related litigation

The decision in ONGC demonstrates the importance of interpreting procedural directions according to their actual scope.

Parties cannot assume that a limited judicial direction will automatically justify indefinite deferment of subsequent proceedings.

9. Practical Checklist for Companies and In-house Legal Teams

The principles emerging from these judgments can be translated into a practical compliance and litigation checklist for corporate legal departments.

1. Review arbitration clauses before executing contracts

Ensure that the arbitration agreement clearly identifies the disputes covered, including whether it extends to earlier transactions or related contractual arrangements.

2. Clearly identify the juridical seat

Avoid ambiguity between the seat and venue of arbitration. Specify the intended supervisory jurisdiction and applicable procedural legislation.

3. Preserve contractual and transactional records

Maintain executed agreements, amendments, correspondence, purchase orders, authorisation letters, invoices and other documents that may establish the existence and scope of contractual obligations.

4. Examine parallel proceedings carefully

Before seeking termination of arbitration, assess whether another pending proceeding actually creates a legal or practical impossibility of continuing arbitration.

5. Draft restrictive covenants carefully

Distinguish between confidentiality, non-solicitation and non-compete provisions. Ensure that the obligations are legally enforceable and properly accepted by the persons intended to be bound.

6. Substantiate applications for interim relief

Applications under Section 9 should be supported by relevant documentary evidence, a clearly established contractual obligation and a demonstrable need for interim protection.

7. Understand the limits of Section 34

A challenge to an arbitral award should be based on legally sustainable grounds rather than a mere disagreement with the tribunal's interpretation or findings.

8. Track appellate and procedural directions

Maintain a clear record of orders passed by arbitral tribunals, Single Judges, Division Benches and the Supreme Court, particularly where proceedings have been deferred or remanded.

Conclusion

The High Court decisions reported during 2025–2026 provide valuable guidance on the practical application of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Taken together, they reinforce an important principle: arbitration must operate within the framework of party consent, contractual obligations and the statutory limitations imposed by the law.

An arbitral tribunal cannot assume jurisdiction over disputes that are not covered by an arbitration agreement. At the same time, parties cannot ordinarily abandon an agreed arbitral mechanism merely because parallel civil proceedings have commenced.

The determination of the juridical seat remains central to supervisory jurisdiction, while the interpretation of contractual provisions continues to fall primarily within the domain of the arbitral tribunal. Similarly, interim protection under Section 9 must be based on legally sustainable grounds, particularly where restrictive covenants and non-signatory parties are involved.

Finally, the limited scope of judicial intervention under Sections 34 and 37 remains essential to preserving the effectiveness and finality of arbitration.

For companies, in-house legal teams, Company Secretaries, advocates and arbitration practitioners, these decisions offer practical lessons in contractual drafting, dispute management, jurisdictional analysis and enforcement strategy.

As India's commercial and regulatory environment continues to evolve, a sound understanding of these judicial developments will remain essential for businesses seeking effective, predictable and legally sustainable dispute-resolution mechanisms.

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Mayank Garg

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